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Abstract 
Public and concessionary finance for the expansion
of power systems in Kenya dwindled in the 1990s.
Meanwhile, demand for electricity services was on
the rise. Private investment emerged to fill the gap
with four Independent Power Producers (IPPs)
established in the country by the second half of the
decade. From 2000, the private market appears to
have collapsed. Expansion of the power sector is
once again led by the incumbent state-owned utili-
ty. 
This paper examines the investment and devel-
opment outcomes of the four IPP projects, and
highlights a number of interesting features of this
experience. Firstly, the regulator matters.
Established after the first wave of IPP develop-
ments, the regulator helped to bring tariffs of the
second wave down. Secondly, the tendering
process (i.e. an international competitive bid) does
not ensure competition for a country that has signif-
icant political risk. Bidders self select well before the
tender begins, a process which led one Kenyan ten-
der to attract only two bidders (one of which was
non-compliant). Thirdly, local partners matter. Half
of the projects had local partners, and those that did
faired better in the long run. The impact of project
financing, public perception and currency devalua-
tion is also evaluated to glean lessons learned of
past projects and help pave the way for a more sus-
tainable future for the Kenyan power sector—which
presently serves only 15% of the population. 
Keywords: Kenya, Independent Power Producers,
electricity sector, electricity production, project
finance, electricity supply industry
1. Introduction: IPP challenge
Prior to the introduction of independent power
projects (IPP), Kenya relied primarily on conces-
sionary funding from multilateral and bilateral
agencies to finance new power investments. In the
1990s, however, the global donor trend shifted
toward private participation in infrastructure with
concessionary funding being targeted at health and
social services. This move away from development
finance for power projects was aggravated by a
general aid embargo, imposed on Kenya through-
out the early and mid-1990s, for reasons linked to
corruption and lack of advancement in the creation
of a multi-party state, which affected all sectors,
including power. Thus, a platform of reform for
opening up the country’s generation sector to pri-
vate participation gradually emerged in the mid-
1990s, paving the way for contracting the first set of
IPPs in 1996 (McEwan, 2001).1
This paper2 examines Kenya’s experience with
private participation in the electricity sector, focus-
ing on four independent power projects (IPP) at the
generation level. The first part of the paper provides
a brief overview of the IPPs, followed by a discus-
sion of the electricity sector including reforms
undertaken to date. Part two involves an analysis of
the development and investment outcomes, name-
ly the extent to which the country and the investors
benefited from the projects and whether such proj-
ects will be replicated in the future.
While the early 1990s ushered in a new model
for financing infrastructure projects, by the end of
the decade developing countries saw foreign direct
investment drop precipitously. From a high of US$
14 billion in 1996, investment in power projects
dropped to a mere US$3 billion in 1999 and to zero
in 2000 (Sader, 1999). A similar pattern was seen in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which reached a peak of
US$0.8 billion in1998, then fell to zero in 2000
(Private Participation in Infrastructure 2003).
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Meanwhile, with limited public funding currently
available, countries are once again faced with the
challenge of how to meet electricity demand going
forward. The Kenyan country study aims to address
this investment conundrum through a detailed
analysis of past and present power sector develop-
ments. 
2. IPP background
Kenya developed four IPPs, for a combined capac-
ity of 190 MW or just under 12% of the total
installed capacity in the country, as detailed in Table
1. 
2.1 Sector reforms
Kenya’s Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) reforms
have focused primarily on the generation sector, for
which public funding was lacking throughout the
1990s, i.e. there were no publicly-funded plants
between 1991 and 1998, despite the fact that
expansion plans for a series of plants had been
drawn up as early as 1991 by the national genera-
tor with implementation slated for 1994 and
beyond. 
In 1996, the Government of Kenya (GoK) offi-
cially liberalized power generation as part of a
power sector reform effort (IFC, 1999) as indicated
in Table 2. From this time onward, it became gov-
ernment policy that all bids for generation facilities
would be put out for competition, open to both
public and private firms, i.e. the national generator
would receive no preferential treatment. 
At the time, the sector was dominated by
hydropower, as seen in Figure 1. All economically
viable hydro sites had, however, been exploited and
therefore diversification became necessary both for
drought mitigation and to meet growing demand. 
Among the first reforms to take place after the
official liberalization was the unbundling of the state
utility in 1997. Kenya Generating Company
Limited (KenGen), which remained entirely in state
hands, became responsible for all generation assets.
Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited (KPLC)
assumed responsibility for all distribution and trans-
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Table 1: Kenya’s IPPs
Projects3 Size Cost Fuel Contract Contract Project tender
(MW) (US$ million) type Yrs - Project operation
Westmont 46 20 Gas turbine, burns Build Own 7 1996-1997
kerosene/gas condensate Operate
(barge-mounted) (BOO)
Iberafrica 56 65 Medium speed diesel, BOO 7, 15 1996-1997
burns HFO 
Tsavo4 75 85 Medium speed BOO 20 1995-2001
diesel, burns HFO
OrPower45 13 54 Geothermal BOO 20 1996-2000
Total 190 224 - - - -
Figure 1: Electricity production by resource (1990 – 2004)
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mission. The state owns 51% of KPLC, with the bal-
ance of shares traded on the Nairobi Stock
Exchange.6
At this early stage of reform, the ESI lacked an
independent regulator. It was not until the Power
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) of both Westmont and
Iberafrica had been signed with KPLC, and the
plants had been commissioned in 1997 that the reg-
ulator was established, through the 1997 Electric
Power Act. It took another year for the Electricity
Regulatory Board (ERB) to start operations.
Although not involved with the first set of PPA
negotiations, ERB maintains that it has monitored
all IPPs since its inauguration in 1998, as per its
mandate. 
Private participation in generation picked up
again in 1998, when the PPA with OrPower4 to
develop between 28 and 100 MW of geothermal
power, was finally signed—marking the third IPP
(after Westmont and Iberafrica). Within another two
years, the PPA for the fourth IPP, to be developed
by Tsavo Power Company (TPC), sponsored by
Cinergy-IPS, Wartsila, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and Commonwealth Develop-
ment Corporation (CDC), was signed.7
Two UK-based consultancies (legal and engi-
neering) assisted KPLC during procurement of the
first two IPPs, while the World Bank financed some
advisors to support the government with negotia-
tions. The same two UK-based consultancies were
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Table 2: Kenya Electricity Sector Developments
Date Development
1922 East African Power and Lighting Company formed and held by private investors (present-
day KPLC’s predecessor)
1954 Kenya Power Company (KPC), 100% government owned, established to transmit power 
from Uganda through the Tororo-Juja line (KenGen’s predecessor); KPC managed by KPLC 
under management contract, i.e. establishing fully-integrated utility
1970 Government of Kenya obtained majority shares in KPLC
1991-1994 Aid embargo impacting all sectors
1995 Tenders for two IPPs initiated by MoE: one diesel (Tsavo), the second geothermal, 
(OrPower4)
1996 Government of Kenya decided to formally introduce competition into the generation sector
1996 Tenders for two additional ‘stop-gap’ IPPs issued by KPLC, PPAs with Westmont and 
Iberafrica signed; plants commissioned one year later
1997 Electricity Regulatory Board (ERB) established under the 1997 Electric Power Act and 
subsequently ERB inaugurated in 1998
1997 KPLC and KPC unbundled and KPC subsequently named KenGen
1998 OrPower4 PPA signed for between 28 and 100 MW 
1998 Tsavo PPA signed for 75 MW 
1999, 2000 ERB sets new retail tariffs
1999-2000 KenGen resumed its expansion plans adding Kipevu I (Diesel) and Olkaria II as well as an 
expansion at Gitaru Hydro, which had been planned in the early 1990s 
1999-2001 3 emergency IPPs introduced during drought (Aggreko, Cummins and Deutz)
2000 OrPower4 began to operate an early generation facility of 9 MW in June 2000 and added 
additional 4 MW for a total of 13 MW six months later; firm indicated that it could provide 
up to 48 MW following a resource assessment, assuming government guarantees provided
2000 Tsavo PPA finalized and plant commissioned in 2001
2003 KenGen reduced tariffs (as set in 1999) from Kenya Shilling (Ksh) 2.36/unit to Ksh 1.76/unit 
2003 Nyanja Commission issued its report on the electricity and petroleum sectors, personnel 
from Westmont, Iberafrica and KPLC indicted (among others) for flawed PPAs
2004 Iberafrica signed 2nd PPA for 15 years; Westmont stopped operating after the completion of 
its initial 7 year PPA 
2004 New energy policy approved by Parliament and a new Energy Bill, amending 1997 Energy 
Act expected to become law later in 2005, which would introduce a number of changes, 
including increasing ERB’s mandate
2005 Plans currently underway for government to sell 30% of its stake in KenGen
again engaged to provide support during the pro-
curement of Tsavo and OrPower4, but this time
under funding assistance extended to the govern-
ment by the World Bank. 
Meanwhile, Kenya was experiencing, by the end
of the 1990s, continuously mounting demand and
finally a resumption of public funding. As a result,
attention turned once again to KenGen and its long
postponed expansion plans: Kipevu I, a 75 MW
diesel plant and an additional unit of 80 MW at the
existing Gitaru hydro facility. In addition, the World
Bank together with the European Investment Bank
(EIB), Germany’s Reconstruction Loan Corpor-
ation (KfW) and the government of Kenya, funded
a 64MW geothermal plant, Olkaria II, which came
into commercial operation in late 2003. These
investments were not open to general competition
with the private sector, contrary to previous policy
statements. 
The next major change to impact generation
reform was the drought starting in 1999, which
prompted the Ministry of Energy to negotiate three
emergency diesel-fired power plants.8 These plants
are largely considered outside the purview of the
ESI reform, even though they were operated by the
private sector, due to the fact that contracts lasted
only a year and a half. 
The most significant impact of the drought was
that it required KPLC to seek more costly power,
which not only financially enfeebled the firm but
also led to inflated prices for the consumer, as both
foreign exchange and fuel costs are passed through
in part.9 With IPPs associated with higher cost
power, the drought led to public outcry against pri-
vate sector participation, which was seen to be tak-
ing advantage of a poor country in a dire situation. 
Allegations of corruption in the power sector,
together with a call to reduce tariffs, gained
momentum. The new government, which came to
power in December 2002, on the heels of the
drought and a drought-induced recession, pledged
specifically to address ESI reform and reduce tariffs.
Among its first measures, the National Rainbow
Coalition charged the Nyanja Commission with
investigating alleged corruption in the electricity
and petroleum sectors. By December 2003, the
Nyanja Report was issued, indicting personnel in
KPLC, Westmont and Iberafrica for corruption and
flawed PPAs (Kenya Risk, 2004). The Nyanja find-
ings have not, however, led to significant changes in
the sector, with the integrity of the Commission itself
being questioned along with the thoroughness of its
investigation.10
While the Nyanja findings have been marginal-
ized, ERB’s efforts to maintain tariffs ‘as low as rea-
sonably possible’ have been ongoing—before, dur-
ing and after the commission’s investigation, as per
the Board’s duties. Table 3 presents generation tar-
iffs, currently regulated by ERB. 
The future of the ESI reform is expected to
involve an initial private offering (IPO) of KenGen,
with 30% of the national generator privatized by
2007; some reports indicate that this may happen
as early as end-2005 (Kenya, 2005 and KenGen
prepares IPO, 2005). As for new generation capac-
ity, the primary development is a 70 MW geother-
mal facility, Olkaria IV, which stakeholders indicate
will undoubtedly be built by KenGen. Work is also
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Table 3: Comparison of all plants: total generation nominal cost per unit, Kenya Shilling
(Ksh)/kilowatt hour (kWh)
Supplier 1999/2000 2000/01 20001/02 2002/03 2003/04 July-Dec 2004 
Iberafrica 8.7 10.2 10.2 10.9 10.4 6.4
Westmont 10.4 11.1 13.5 33.8* 59.7* 54.8*
OrPower4 - 6.1 6.6 6.4 7.1 6.1
Tsavo - 4.2 5.6 6.8 11.1* 7.5
UETCL (imports) 5.3 5.5 4.8 4.4 4.4 4.4
KenGen Thermal 8.3 9.4 7.0 7.3 5.2 7.1
KenGen Non-Thermal 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.8
KenGen Overall 4.0 4.9 3.1 2.8 2.2 2.4
Mumias (bagasse) - 6.6 6.7 - - -
EPPS (leased plant) - 7.2 - - - -
Annual weighted average 
cost per unit from all sources 4.6 6.1 4.4 4.0 3.3 3.6
Note: Data was provided by KPLC; IPP tariffs are a function of the capacity charge as well as the volume of energy
generated and the prevailing fuel prices. *These particularly steep costs reflect the following situation: in 2002-2004,
there were more favourable hydrological conditions in Kenya hence the unit cost from thermal plants was high since
the capacity charges are paid regardless of the amount of generation.
underway on the second phase of Sondu Miriu, a
60 MW publicly-financed hydropower plant slated
to come on line by 2006, which was initially
planned for the early 1990s but was abandoned in
the aftermath of Turkwel,11 the aid embargo and
environmental concerns.12 Joint-ventures with the
state utility are also under consideration. 
Also in the pipeline is the separation of trans-
mission and distribution with a national Transco
slated for end-2006. It has been hinted that future
IPPs might have to compete more fiercely with
interconnections, including that with Uganda,
Tanzania and other SADC countries. Government
oversight has been and is expected to continue
increasing, and some stakeholders even speculate
that government guarantees may be part of future
IPP negotiations. 
Figure 2 presents a schema of the current ESI.
As of 2005, the Kenyan ESI consists of five different
generation companies, and one integrated trans-
mission and distribution company. Despite reforms
and the introduction of IPPs, generation remains
dominated by KenGen, which provides approxi-
mately 85.3% of all electric power in Kenya. The
remaining four generation companies, which con-
tribute about 11.2% of Kenya’s power, are the inde-
pendent power producers (IPP), with majority
stakes owned respectively by Westmont,13 Union
Fenosa, Cinergy (Duke)-IPS,14 and OrPower4.
Imports from the Uganda Electricity Transmission
Company (UETCL) meet about 3.4% of Kenya’s
demand. Finally the Rural Electrification
Programme (REP), administered by KPLC and ini-
tiated in 1973, provides the balance of 0.2%, main-
ly in remote, isolated grids. Transmission and distri-
bution is owned and operated by KPLC (Kenya
Power & Lighting Company 2004 and SAD-ELEC
2004). 
The Electricity Regulatory Board, which is
directed on policy measures by the Ministry of
Energy, regulates the generation, transmission and
distribution of electric power in Kenya. ERB sets
and reviews tariffs and also approves electric power
purchase contracts, including those of IPPs. To date
government has never overturned an ERB deci-
sion. While the Board maintains a significant degree
of autonomy, in the six years of its operation, it has
had five different chairmen (all appointed by the
President), which has undermined the institutional
memory and capacity of the organization. The
ERB’s role should widen to include regulation of the
energy sector (including petroleum), assuming the
proposed new energy bill passes through
Parliament. 
As of 2004, KPLC served around 686 000 cus-
tomers. According to the Kamfor Study, the latest
assessment carried out by the Ministry of Energy in
2000, 15% of the Kenyan population have access
to electricity, with access in urban areas measuring
47% and that in rural areas a mere 3.8%. Although
accounting for 85% of all customers, domestic and
small commercial and industrial users represent just
36% of total revenue, depicted in Table 4. 
Finally, it is worth noting in this context that
KPLC incurred losses from the start of the drought
of 1999 until 2003-2004, when the firm achieved
modest profit, i.e. KSh 457 807 after tax (US$1 =
Ksh 78.09, average exchange rate for January
2005). The losses were due to the fact that KPLC
budgeted Ksh 6.29/kWh in 1999 for its retail tariff
(without fuel cost and foreign exchange adjust-
ments); meanwhile, the actual average selling price
was Ksh 5.66 per unit in 1999-2000 and Ksh 5.86
per unit in 2000-2001. The situation was exacer-
bated by: reduced sales due to drought-induced
economic recession; high line losses (with the
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Table 4: Kenya electricity customer categories and tariffs 
Category GWh Customers Total revenue Avg tariff 
Ksh (mil) price Ksh/ /kWh
Domestic, small commercial and small industrial 1376 680 277 8 885 6.46
Medium commercial and industrial 819 3 144 5 329 6.51
Large commercial and industrial 1638 424 8 816 5.21
Off-peak 55 918 272 4.95
Street Lighting 7 1 156 51 7.29
REP 150 93 442 978 6.52
Total/average 4 045 779 361 24 331 6.16
Figure 2: Kenya electricity supply industry
drought, the majority of the power was sourced
from more remote stations in the south); increased
customer payment default; increased theft; and
increased fuel prices in the international market,
which could not be fully passed on to consumers
due to a pricing formula which assumes losses of
maximum 15%.15 The more recent change in
KPLC’s balance sheet is accredited to the fact that
normal hydrological conditions have returned.
KenGen also converted Ksh 12.3 billion in debt
owed by KPLC into equity in September 2003
(KenGen 2003). In addition, KenGen has reduced
its selling price by 25% from Ksh 2.36 per unit (as
set in August 1999) to Ksh 1.76 (as agreed in July
2003 with KPLC), but still registered profits of Ksh 2
519 879 000 in 2003.16 Furthermore, KPLC is no
longer paying Westmont capacity charges, which
amounted to US$818 000 per month, as the devel-
oper did not negotiate a second PPA. 
2.2 IPP frameworks and projects
developed
Kenya has witnessed three different IPP frame-
works, yielding seven IPPs. A fourth framework is
currently underway. As noted in Section II a, in
2004, IPPs contributed 11.2% or 186.5 MW of
Kenya’s installed capacity.17
The first IPP developments occurred on the
heels of the 1996 legislation opening up the gener-
ation sector to private investment. With power
demand increasing, hydrological conditions weak-
ening and insufficient public funds to build power
plants, KPLC ordered two stop-gap IPPs in 1996.
The PPAs stipulated seven-year contracts for two
plants: a 46 MW barge-mounted kerosene burning
gas turbine and a 44 MW medium speed diesel gen-
erator, burning Low Sulphur Fuel Oil (LSFO).
Fifteen firms bid for these plants in what has been
characterized as a selective international tender, i.e.
with specific firms invited to bid. Of the 15 firms,
Westmont, a Malaysian consortium, and Iberafrica,
with majority shares owned by Spain’s Union
Fenosa, submitted the lowest bids and subsequent-
ly secured the contracts. Plants were commissioned
less than a year later helping to plug the power
shortage. It was here that the first IPP framework
began and ended, as all subsequent plants would
be developed under different conditions. 
The second IPP framework, which first emerged
in 1995, when tenders were initially floated, was
realized starting in 1998 when OrPower4, owned
100% by Ormat, a US-Israeli firm, signed a PPA to
develop up to 100 MW of geothermal power. At the
time of signing, OrPower4 assumed ownership of 9
MW of existing wells. To these the firm added an
additional 4 MW during the emergency power crisis
of 1999-2001. Since 1998, OrPower4 has complet-
ed resource assessments of the geothermal fields,
which it is leasing from the government, and has
determined that the known proven geothermal
reserves are 58 MW, the amount which is contrac-
tually required for a 48 MW plant. As a pre-condi-
tion to developing the additional 35 MW, however,
the firm has required a supplemental PPA, as dis-
cussed in the next section. 
A further IPP was built during this second IPP
framework: a 75 MW medium speed diesel genera-
tor, burning Low Residual Fuel Oil (LRFO). The
PPA, awarded to the Tsavo Power Company, was
finalized in 2000, and the plant came on stream one
year later (Wartsila was the initial bidder, and sub-
sequently brought on co-bidders, IPS, IFC and
Cinergy). Delays in the Tsavo plant have been
attributed primarily to the financing. As Tsavo was
the region’s first project-financed power plant, there
was little knowledge among stakeholders, and, the
political risk prevalent at the time kept many poten-
tial funders at bay. In contrast to the first IPP frame-
work, which was a selective international tender,
both the OrPower4 and Tsavo plants followed inter-
national competitive bid guidelines. While this was
considered a more transparent process, the compe-
tition was limited: only three firms bid for Tsavo and
two (of which one was non-compliant) for the
OrPower4 plant. 
A third IPP framework spanned 1999 – 2001.
By 1999, hydrological conditions had worsened.
With no clear end in sight, the MoE decided to
arrange a competitive bid for three emergency
diesel-fuel IPPs. These units, awarded to Aggreko,
Cummins and Deutz, three privately-owned foreign
providers, for a combined 105 MW (587 GWh)
were rented between 2000 and 2001.18 Considered
quasi-IPPs by some, these projects were negotiated
directly between project sponsors and the govern-
ment. World Bank IDA credit of US$72 million was
also made available for these plants. Due to the fact
that fuel is a pass-through to consumers, however,
end-users bore the bulk of the cost, with govern-
ment providing a subsidy only for the duty
charge.19
A fourth framework is under development, and
is largely a function of the pending energy bill.
Among the changes that this new framework may
introduce are: 
• Government ownership of the geothermal
resource-assessment process through the
Geothermal Development Company, which
would mean that IPP developers, such as
OrPower4 would not be responsible for con-
ducting their own assessments; the entity may
also sell steam (as fuel) to either KenGen and/or
IPPs;
• Provisions for large consumers to purchase
power directly from generators with KPLC giv-
ing unfettered access to the transmission system
(for a fee);
• New tax structure for IPPs, which would ulti-
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mately prove more favourable to investors; 
• Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) contracts
(rather than BOO);20
• Special tariff regimes for off-grid developers to
ensure that investments are commercially viable; 
• New provisions for pico, micro and mini-hydros
as well as other renewables.
3 Analysis of outcomes
The value of IPP projects for investors and host
countries and the sustainability of these projects
(i.e. if contracts hold and future investments are
made) depend on whether investment and devel-
opment outcomes remain broadly in balance.
Returns to investors have to be adequate, invest-
ment opportunities should grow and the price and
reliability of power should be satisfying for electrici-
ty consumers. These investment and development
outcomes are influenced by a number of country-
level and project-level factors. 
3.1 Country-level factors
A review of the international experience of IPPs
reveals a number of country-level factors, shown in
Table 5, which are particularly important in evalu-
ating development and investment outcomes.21
These factors, namely exogenous shocks, the
investment climate and the electricity market, have
often determined the fate a project. For instance,
macroeconomic shock forced workouts in numer-
ous projects throughout South America and East
Asia. 
Only some of these country-level factors are rel-
evant to Kenya’s experience. With respect to exoge-
nous shocks, Kenya has not been affected by a one-
time macroeconomic shock and currency devalua-
tion. Over the course of the 1990s, however, the
country did see its currency depreciate more than
300% (from Ksh 22.9 = US$1 in 1990 to Ksh 75.9
= US$1 in 2003). Insofar as all PPAs are denomi-
nated in US dollars, this creeping devaluation does
have an impact on the country and IPP outcomes.
Investments are growing more costly as is fuel,
which is imported in the case of Westmont,
Iberafrica and Tsavo. 
A second exogenous factor to be noted is
drought. The first two IPPs, both diesel-fired, were
rushed through to help plug the power shortage cre-
ated by drought conditions of 1996-7. The third IPP
(OrPower4) was requested to increase its capacity
during another drought in 1999. In each of these
instances, power was ultimately more expensive
due to the emergency nature of the situation.
Furthermore, after hydrological conditions returned
to normal, the country was still locked into contracts
with take or pay requirements. 
As regards Kenya’s investment climate, it was
lacklustre throughout the 1990s with a GDP com-
pound annual growth rate of 1.73% from 1990 to
2000 and just 1.37% between 1997 and 2000.
Foreign Direct Investment fell by 3.40% a year over
the decade. Kenya faced a donor embargo through-
out much of the 1990s, which also impacted on
investments in the electricity sector. Although
organized as international competitive tenders, the
tenders ultimately awarded to Tsavo and OrPower4
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Table 5: Country level factors that affect IPP development and investment outcomes
Exogenous shocks 
• macroeconomic shock (especially currency devaluation) 
• drought 
• war/civil unrest 
Investment climate22
• recent local and foreign private investment , i.e. precedent of private sector participation
• investor perception based partly on history as well as:
- state of the economy
- political stability and independent and established legal system
- level of corruption
- sovereign credit rating
- multilateral and bilateral donor commitments
- security guarantees (including availability of sovereign guarantees) 
Electricity market
• market structure (e.g. single buyer model), including role of state utility
• role and strength of regulator
• wholesale and retail price cost/coverage
• electricity supply/demand balance
• incumbent fuel
• sector procurement policy
• prevalence of back-up generators and degree to which industrial/commercial base rely on grid
• extent of interconnections with other countries
only attracted three and two bids, respectively, as
mentioned earlier. Therefore, those investors who
did approach Kenya were few and far between and
ultimately charged higher risk premiums to offset
the perceived high risks, which were exacerbated by
the absence of sovereign guarantees. 
As with the investment climate, Kenya’s electric-
ity market had a significant impact on outcomes.
Firstly, although common among African countries,
Kenya’s demand profile is miniscule (with just 1.2
GW installed capacity) compared to other develop-
ing countries in Latin America, East and South
Asia, and Central Europe, which saw IPP invest-
ment. Little demand potential therefore inhibited
investment. Another factor is that IPPs were per-
ceived to be competing against ‘cheap hydro’, the
incumbent fuel in Kenya (even though economical-
ly hydro sites had been exploited and the country
faced drought conditions for much of the 1990s).
This (mis)perception ultimately weighed against
investors. Finally, the evolving regulatory regime
had a large impact on outcomes. An independent
regulator in Kenya was only established in 1998,
after the first PPAs with Westmont and Iberafrica
had been signed. These first PPAs therefore lacked
the oversight of a third party which would have
scrutinized tariffs and other terms of the contracts
(especially contract duration) to a greater degree.
Although Kenya’s options were limited given the
donor embargo and investor wariness, an inde-
pendent regulator would have undoubtedly helped
in the negotiating process, which largely resulted in
an outcome that favoured investors at the expense
of development outcomes. In the next set of IPPs
with TPC and OrPower4, the Electricity Regulatory
Board played a critical role, insisting on lower tar-
iffs. ERB also influenced the renegotiation with
Iberafrica for a second PPA with KPLC, which ulti-
mately culminated in a capacity charge equal to
50% the original. 
3.2 Project-level factors
The project level factors, seen in Table 6, which
emerged as significant in the global IPP context are:
project partners, finance, the PPA, fuel type and
agreements, public perception and project manage-
ment. Each of the factors, with specific relevance to
the Kenyan case study will be evaluated separately. 
3.2.1 Project partners
There was substantial variety in the project partner-
ing across the four IPPs. Two of the four IPPs had
local partners (Iberafrica and Tsavo);23 one had the
involvement of a multilateral agency (Tsavo); two of
the projects had stakeholders with a longer commit-
ment to the country (Iberafrica and Tsavo), and
only one of the four was a project-finance deal
(Tsavo) with the other three relying on the balance
sheets of their sponsors. 
In the case of Iberafrica, the local partner con-
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Table 6: Project level factors that affect IPP development and investment  outcomes
Project partners 
• local/international investors
• multilateral agencies
• firms’ commitment to sector/country
• equity turnover
Project finance
• debt vs. equity 
• sources
• seniority of debt
PPA
• off-take agreement (including ownership/transfer and risk allocation)
• degree of sovereign or other guarantees for agreement
• provisions for dispute settlement
• impact on off-taker
Fuel type and agreements
• imported or locally available fuel 
• exposure to FX risk
• government or other supplier
Political & public perception
• what did the general public and politicians think (and why)? 
• to what extent did the general public and political process influence the project and future projects?
Project management
• O&M 
Budgeting
sisted of the KPLC Pension Fund (who owns 20%
of the project). According to personnel at Iberafrica,
a local partner was considered a requirement for
Union Fenosa given Kenya’s country risk at the time
of investment. While the alliance between Iberafrica
and the KPLC Pension Fund may have helped
assuage Union Fenosa, it has been subject to some
criticism and controversy, namely that with involve-
ment with KPLC, the off-taker, there could not be a
fair and transparent evaluation of competing bids.
These allegations have been denied by both
Iberafrica and KPLC who argue that the Pension
Fund is governed independently from KPLC with a
separate board of trustees. Thus the direct impact
on outcomes is difficult to determine. On the one
hand, the local partner assisted in providing securi-
ty to the multinational firm; on the other hand, the
local partner ultimately raised doubts about the
project sponsor’s integrity. Suffice it to say, actions
speak louder than words and Iberafrica (with the
partnership intact between Union Fenosa and
KPLC Pension Fund) has managed to negotiate a
second PPA, under the supervision of ERB, for a
duration of 15 years, which would indicate that the
arrangement is both sustainable and favourable. 
Tsavo Power Company’s local partner consists
of Industrial Promotion Services (IPS), Aga Khan’s
Fund for Economic Development (AKFED) operat-
ing arm in the industrial sector throughout Asia and
Africa. Although IPS has a global reach, the firm
has been established in Kenya since 1963 and
therefore for all intents and purposes was consid-
ered a local partner. While IPS projects must make
commercial sense, they must also serve a clear
developmental function for the country/community.
The Tsavo plant met both criteria for IPS. The
developmental function was met by the fact that the
75 MW would help Kenya plug a severe power
shortage, i.e. the plant amounted to 28% and 34%
of country’s total thermal/geothermal generation in
2001-2002 and 2002-2003, respectively, and up to
10% of the gross annual energy requirement in
2002-2003.24 In addition, the plant was expected to
contribute to a reduction in tariffs, as it was signifi-
cantly less expensive than emergency power gener-
ation procured at US$0.30-.40/kWh. The commer-
cial aspect was met by the fact that: a reasonable
return on investment was expected (i.e. mid-teens);
a series of first rate investors were involved; and the
security package, together with the 20-year PPA
promised a sound and secure arrangement with the
national utility. Ultimately the local partner played a
substantial role as it formed the backbone of the
strategic partnership with Cinergy (Duke); together
these two firms represent 49.9% of the equity. It
may be concluded that the local partner had a pos-
itive impact on both the investment and develop-
ment outcomes. 
While multilateral institutions were absent in the
first round of IPPs, the IFC took both an equity
stake in and played an important role in providing
and arranging debt for Tsavo. As the private sector
arm of the World Bank, IFC saw the Tsavo invest-
ment as a critical development to help meet rising
power shortages in Kenya, which were adversely
affecting the economy. Funds were not forthcoming
from either international donors or the private sec-
tor as the former was maintaining an aid embargo
and the latter was hindered by the myriad risks,
heightened by the political instability, of any such
investments. IFC thus saw its role as key in assuring
private sector participants of project integrity and
stability. IFC also recognized the potential ‘demon-
stration effect’ of the project as it aimed to be the
first project-financed deal in the region. Both the
investors and host country alike have benefited
from IFC’s decision to participate in Tsavo. It should
be noted in this context, that certain other investors
in Kenya’s IPP sector (e.g. Ormat) had an expecta-
tion that the multilateral funding institutions would
participate to a greater extent (than they ultimately
did).
As regards firms’ commitment to the country,
the difference in the commitment among project
developers is stark. The Malaysian based firm,
Westmont, had only one African project. The firm
entered the market with the signing of its PPA in
1996-7 and left promptly in 2004 after failing to
agree on a tariff with KPLC. It is suspected that this
abrupt departure was in part a function of the finan-
cial condition of Westmont’s parent company in
Malaysia as well. That said, there was little staying
power and ultimately little long-term success.
Iberafrica stands in contrast. Union Fenosa, the
majority stakeholder in the project, entered Kenya
in 1994-5, two years prior to the electricity offer,
when its IT arm won a contract to provide services
to GoK. Thereafter, the company established itself
in the country, creating favourable ties and a solid
name for itself. Tsavo’s commitment is observed
through its local partner’s presence, dating from the
1960s. Finally, Ormat’s commitment spans only the
time of its contract. The firm entered both the coun-
try and the continent for the first time when it
signed its PPA with KPLC. As noted earlier, Tsavo
has been characterized as the most successful from
both a development and an investment perspective.
It is also the firm with the longest commitment to
Kenya. 
3.2.2 Project finance
The financing arrangements for each of the IPPs are
quite distinct, as summarized in Table 7. 
In the case of the stop-gap IPPs, firms were
given 11 months to bring plants on line from the
signing of the PPAs, which meant that firms had to
rely primarily on their own balance sheets rather
than setting up elaborate project finance arrange-
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ments. Project costs for Westmont, the first stop-gap
IPP, amounted to US$20 million. Little is known
about how exactly the Malaysian consortium fund-
ed this plant, but it is believed that it relied mostly
on company funds.25 In contrast, the cost of
Iberafrica, the second stop-gap IPP, totalled
US$65.1 million and the firm shared costs with a
local partner and through local and foreign com-
mercial banks. The discrepancy in project costs,
between the similar sized Westmont and Iberafrica
plants, can be attributed to two primary factors
namely, technology and location. Westmont is a
barge-mounted open cycle gas turbine (using
kerosene), located off Mombassa while Iberafrica is
a diesel generator, located near Nairobi.
In contrast to Westmont, Iberafrica’s financing
structure is more widely known. The project, which
was carried out in two phases with the first phase of
44 MW priced at US$54.5 million and the second
phase of 12 MW costing US$10.5 million. Project
equity amounts to US$ 18 million. Ownership is
shared, with 80% held by First Independent Power
East Africa Limited—an entity owned by two
Spanish firms, Union Fenosa (90%) and JHR
Consultants (10%) – and 20% held by the KPLC
Staff Pension Fund. Project debt, amounting to
US$47.1 million, was provided directly and indi-
rectly by Union Fenosa and the Staff Pension Fund.
TPC followed a different route than its prede-
cessors, Westmont and Iberafrica, with regard to
financing. Unlike with the first two plants, TPC was
not required to commission its plant within an 11
month timeframe, which allowed the company to
seek out more creative financing schemes. Tsavo
became the first project in East Africa to be financed
on a project finance basis without government
guarantees. Project equity, amounting to US$18.93
million or 22% of total project costs, was split
among IPS-Cinergy (49.9%), which comprises a
local partner and an American-based power com-
pany, CDC, a public-private UK development enti-
ty, now Globeleq (30%), Wartsila, a designer and
operator of power plants (15%), and IFC (5%).26
Project debt for Tsavo, amounting to US$ 66.06
million, was provided by IFC (US$17 million in
direct loans and US$26 million syndicated loans),
CDC (US$13 million in direct loans) and the
German Investment & Development Corporation
(DEG) (EUR 11 million in direct loans and EUR 2
million in syndicated loans). Given the absence of
sovereign guarantees, which are generally a pre-
requisite for a project-financed investment in a
developing country, a series of alternate arrange-
ments were made. Key documents for project com-
pletion were the Letter of Comfort provided by the
government and the security package provided by
KPLC. The Letter of Comfort addresses force
majeure and political issues, but does not qualify as
a sovereign guarantee due to its limited application
and coverage. The security package involves an
escrow account to which KPLC must provide one
months payment of approximately US$4 million for
the duration of 12 years, i.e. the period of primary
debt repayment; and a stand-by Letter of Credit,
which covers three months billing of approximately
US$12 million. Initially 100% cash cover was
required for the Letter of Credit; however, this has
since been eased to 20%. 
It should be reiterated here that no plants
received government guarantees – although the
costs of the emergency power plants were support-
ed in part by government. Kenya has maintained a
policy of not extending government guarantees to
private sector projects, unless there is an overriding
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Table 7: IPP project financing
Project (US$ million) Westmont Iberafrica Tsavo OrPower4
Total project costs 20 65.1a 85 54b
Total equity and % NA 18 (27.6%) 18.97 (22.4%) NA
Total debt NA 47.1 (72.4%) 66.03 (77.6%) NA
Local equity 0 3.6 % of 9.46c 0
Local debt 0 14.4 0 0
International (private) debt NA 32.7 >26 NA
Multilateral and bilateral financing 0 0 40 0d
Notes:
a. Iberafrica, total project costs US$65 million, with first phase (44 MW) priced at US$51.5 million and second 
phase (12 MW) at US$13.5. 
b. US$54 million includes the amount invested in a 13 MW power plant and completed geothermal wells for 58 
MW including 20% reserves to support a 48 MW power plant. 
c. IPS and Cinergy jointly own 49.9% of project equity, IPS is a local partner.
d. MIGA guarantee provided.
public interest. 
Finally, financial closure for OrPower4 has not
yet been achieved. To date, US$54 million has
been invested solely by Ormat—for both appraisal
and drilling of the new geothermal wells. Contrary
to its initial expectation, the firm has been unable to
enlist either multilateral financing institutions (MFIs)
or any other international energy companies,
although it did obtain a MIGA guarantee. After wit-
nessing the financial position of KPLC disintegrate
in 1999, Ormat requested a supplemental PPA,
which specified a Letter of Comfort and security
package, similar to those obtained by TPC. Neither
KPLC nor MoE have acquiesced and therefore
development of a further 35 MW identified by
OrPower4 during a resource assessment remain
undeveloped. 
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that the star proj-
ect, Tsavo, had the most diverse project financing,
however, the deal also took the longest to close. 
3.2.3 PPAs 
Among the most apparent differences in the first
three IPP frameworks is the duration of the PPAs –
with the first stop-gap framework stipulating seven
years, the second, specifying 20 years and the third,
emergency framework, covering only the period of
the drought. The emergency plants understandably
were temporary.27 In the first period, the Iberafrica
and Westmont plants, providing about 100 MW of
power, were seen as a ‘stop-gap’ measure to quick-
ly meet capacity shortages. Publicly-financed
plants, which were considered less costly, were in
the pipeline, but funding was not forthcoming.
Government opted for a short-term solution with
the expectation that by, if not before, 2004 when
the PPAs were slated to end, the situation would be
altered, i.e. potentially more favourable for the gov-
ernment/country. Furthermore, given the political
risk at the time of stop-gap IPPs, investors were
wary of committing to longer terms. The second IPP
framework was the first indication of the govern-
ment seeking a longer-term solution to private
investment in the sector.
There is also a marked difference in the generat-
ing costs of the IPPs with the first wave (Westmont
and Iberafrica) amounting to approximately double
the cost of the second wave (Tsavo and OrPower4)
as depicted in Table 3. The higher cost of the first
wave has been accredited to the short timeline allot-
ted and severe drought condition. It is noteworthy
that the second wave was not only cheaper than the
first, but it was also competitive with KenGen’s
plants. 
The major commonality among the PPAs of all
Kenyan IPPs was the Build Own Operate (BOO)
structure. Reasons provided for why Kenya adopt-
ed the BOO structure are varied: it was a simpler
arrangement than BOOT; it was a World Bank rec-
ommendation; a BOO mitigated project risk, by
ensuring that developers would properly maintain
their plants. The vast majority of stakeholders, how-
ever, appear to be uncertain about why such a
structure was adopted. Also it is worth reiterating in
this context that is that going forward, government
stakeholders are keen to explore the BOOT struc-
ture.
In addition to being BOOs, the PPAs signed
between KPLC and project developers specified
take-if-tendered conditions, i.e. the plant must be
prepared to deliver electric energy if asked to do so,
with the following capacity levels stipulated:
Westmont, Iberafrica and Tsavo at 85% and
OrPower4 at 92%. 
Of the four PPAs negotiated with KPLC, none
have been cancelled to date, although one has
expired and one has been renewed on different
terms. In August 2001, Iberafrica expressed its inter-
est to both ERB and KPLC to negotiate a second
PPA (as per the Electric Power Act such a request
must be initiated three years before license/PPA
expires). Negotiations commenced at this time.
KPLC and Iberafrica reached agreement on tariffs,
however, ERB rejected the rates. Thereafter,
Iberafrica and ERB reached agreement on rates, but
KPLC rejected the rates. In December 2002, the
new government came to power, and all negotia-
tions were stalled until June 2003 due to changes in
ERB, MoE and KPLC staff. In April 2002, Iberafrica
reduced the capacity charge of its first PPA by 37%.
This was not a renegotiation per se, but a voluntary
act on behalf of the firm to demonstrate its commit-
ment to a second PPA.28 In September 2003,
Iberafrica reduced its capacity charge again—this
time to 59% of the original PPA agreement. Finally,
when re-negotiations re-commenced they culminat-
ed in agreement on a second PPA (for a duration of
15 years) in August 2004, in which the capacity
charge agreed was 50% that of the original PPA.
Westmont also requested a second PPA, but the
firm and KPLC could not agree on a tariff. As a
result, Westmont did not pursue any formal proce-
dure with ERB. In August 2004, with the comple-
tion of its seven-year PPA, Westmont ceased oper-
ating. Currently, the barge mounted gas turbine is
resting idle off of Mombassa. There is some specu-
lation that KenGen may purchase the unit, but there
was no confirmation as of June 2005.
In the case of OrPower4, a supplemental PPA
has been requested by the firm to mitigate financial
risks posed by the off-taker, KPLC. Further devel-
opment (i.e. above the existing 13 MW) is contin-
gent on the supplemental PPA, discussed in the pre-
vious section, but to date, neither KPLC nor the
MoE have agreed to the changes. 
Suffice it to say the project that has met with the
greatest success (Tsavo) also had the most compre-
hensive PPA. 
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3.2.4 Political and public perception29
The IPPs have generally been perceived as expen-
sive, i.e. more expensive than KenGen. Owners
have also been portrayed as opportunistic, profiting
from Kenya’s drought situation and poor invest-
ment climate. Absent from these portrayals has
been an accurate description of the state’s inability
to finance and build competitive plants within a
short timeframe. Few IPP owners have countered
the stereotypes, with the exception to Tsavo. Tsavo
has also developed a US$1 million community
development fund, disbursing US$50K annually
(over the 20-year PPA) to benefit environmental
and social activities in Kenya’s Coast Region. 
While it appears that the predominately negative
public perception has not forced change in existing
plants, it may be among the factors influencing
future IPPs, i.e. no existing plans for additional
plants.30
4 Conclusion 
The IPP experience in Kenya is interesting in a
number of respects. Despite a difficult investment
climate (e.g. an aid embargo and no sovereign
guarantees available) foreign investment was made
in IPPs. Initial stop-gap IPPs were understandably
expensive, with wholesale tariffs more than three
times KenGen’s. High prices are attributed to the
fact that plants were procured during a drought,
under severe time pressures, with a truncated ten-
der process. Furthermore, with PPAs of only seven
years duration, investors had little time to extract
returns. In the second wave of IPPs, projects were
tendered under international competitive bid stan-
dards. The result was significantly cheaper power
than the first wave, with wholesale tariffs competi-
tive with KenGen’s. During this second wave,
Iberafrica (one of the initial stop-gap IPPs) also
halved its capacity charge in its negotiations for a
second PPA. 
In the end, Kenya experienced a fairly positive
development outcome. The requisite power was
supplied, albeit initially at a high rate to the country
and consumer. Later, prices became more compet-
itive. Throughout, however, Kenya has experienced
significant devaluation of its currency. Between
1990 and 2003, the Kenyan Shilling depreciated
more than 300%. Considering all PPAs are denom-
inated in US dollars, this change weighs heavily on
the country. As for investment outcomes, in the first
wave, it is believed that investors faired well given
the high tariffs charged. In the second wave, out-
comes appear to have been positive, but more
modest. All deals (in both the first and second
waves) have held, which is a positive indicator for
investment outcomes. 
In addition, a number of interesting features of
Kenya’s IPP experience can be noted, namely the
nature of the project partners, the role that multilat-
eral agencies played as well as the role of the regu-
lator. As regards project partners, Malaysian based
Westmont had no prior experience in Africa.
Equally inexperienced in Africa was Ormat, an
US/Israeli based firm. These two companies opted
not to engage local partners. Westmont has since
left after it failed to reach agreement on a second
PPA and Ormat (through project company
OrPower4) has developed only 13 MW, or just 10%
of the maximum size specified in its contract. In
contrast, both Iberafrica and Tsavo Power
Company had significant local partner stakehold-
ers, each with a long-term experience in Kenya.
Union Fenosa, the dominant shareholder in
Iberafrica, also had additional projects in Kenya’s IT
sector. The Iberafica and Tsavo plants have faired
significantly better than Westmont and OrPower4.
Iberafrica negotiated a second 15 year PPA, and
Tsavo is recognized as the first project-finance deal
in East Africa to be realized without government
guarantees. Tsavo has also made a good name for
itself through its US$1 million community develop-
ment fund. Finally noteworthy in the context of
project partners is the role that IPS and Globeleq
are playing across the continent and the emergence
of a new breed of investor. As European and
American based firms such as InterGen and AES
have retreated to their home markets, IPS and
Globeleq have stepped in to fill the development
gap, picking up majority stakes in Egypt’s Sidi Krir
(682 MW), Tanzania’s Songas (180 MW) and
Uganda’s Bujagali (250 MW). While motivated by
commercial interests, both Globeleq and IPS also
have a larger appetite for risk and a commitment to
emerging markets. It is expected that future devel-
opments will be led by these types of firms. 
Multilateral agencies were largely absent from
the first wave of IPPs (other than to assist govern-
ment in negotiating) but played an important role
with regard to the second wave. IFC took both an
equity stake in and arranged the syndication for
Tsavo. OrPower4 obtained a MIGA guarantee. The
involvement of multilaterals helped give credibility
to projects and in the case of Tsavo provide reas-
surance to other investors, namely the American
powerhouse Cinergy, who together with local part-
ner IPS, took the majority share of the project. IFC
also resisted any changes to renegotiating Tsavo’s
tariff.
Finally, the role of the regulator is noteworthy in
Kenya’s IPP experience. Inaugurated in 1998, after
PPAs with Westmont and Iberafrica had been
signed, ERB was also noticeably absent from the
first wave. The Board was, however, able to apply
pressure on Iberafrica as it negotiated its second
PPA and can be credited with helping to reduce
capacity charges. ERB oversaw Tsavo’s develop-
ment from start to finish and has also been intri-
cately involved in OrPower4. It maintains an impor-
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tant tariff setting function. Despite these achieve-
ments, ERB’s institutional memory and capacity
have been undermined by changes in personnel: in
the six years of its operation, it has had five differ-
ent chairmen (all appointed by the President) and
numerous board changes.
While the existing IPPs appear to be here to stay
(save Westmont), future development remains
uncertain. Recent investments in the power sector
have been supported by multilateral agencies in
alliance with KenGen. KenGen’s expected IPO of
30% of its shares may change the dynamics of the
electricity market, but for now, it appears to be busi-
ness as usual (pre-1990s). Multilateral and bilateral
aid will, however, probably be insufficient to meet
either the actual or latent power needs in Kenya,
where only 15% of the population has access.
Further private sector investment thus seems
inevitable.31 Creating a sustainable balance
between investment and development outcomes is
Kenya’s challenge. 
Notes
1 This paper is based largely on interviews and corre-
spondence, conducted between December 2004 and
August 2005, with stakeholders involved in Kenya’s
IPP experience, from the following organizations: the
Ministry of Energy, Kenya Power & Lighting
Company Limited, the Electricity Regulatory Board,
Kenya Generating Company Limited, Ormat, Tsavo
Power Company, Industrial Promotion Services,
Iberafrica, and the International Finance Corporation.
Due to the sensitivity of the data, individual names
are not cited. While every effort has been made to
capture the diversity of views expressed by different
stakeholders, the authors have also sought to ensure
the accuracy of all statements by confirming individ-
ual statements with the larger pool of stakeholders. 
2 The paper is part of a global IPP study, led by
Stanford University’s Program on Energy and
Sustainable Development (PESD), which includes
detailed reports on twelve different countries. The
overarching purpose of the study is to evaluate the
IPP experiences across a number of countries and
projects and thereby glean best and better practices
for the future. See http://pesd.stanford.edu/docs/ipps
php for information on the PESD IPP study. 
3 In addition, three emergency power plants, owned
and operated by private companies, Cummins, Deutz
and Agrekko, totaling 105 MW, were rented for 1.5
years between 1999-2001 to plug the power shortage
during the drought. 
4 The Tsavo plant, which is owned and operated by
Tsavo Power Company (TPC) is also commonly
referred to as Kipevu II. For the sake of clarity, the
authors will use ‘Tsavo’ throughout this paper. 
5 The OrPower4 plant, which is owned and operated
by Ormat, is also commonly referred to as Olkaria III.
For the sake of clarity, the authors will use ‘OrPower4’
throughout this paper.
6 Of the 51%, approximately 10% is owned by the
National Social Security Fund. The government’s
direct stake is therefore only about 40%. Private
KPLC shares had been traded on the Nairobi Stock
Exchange (NSE) as early as 1954 when the NSE was
started. Prior to that, the firm was listed on the
London Stock Exchange. 
7 Cinergy-IPS, the majority shareholder in TPC is a
joint venture between Cinergy Global Power Inc. and
Industrial Promotion Services (Kenya) Ltd. As of May
2005, Duke Energy has bought Cinergy’s stake. 
8 It was estimated by the World Bank that without the
emergency power facilities, losses to the economy
would amount to US$400 million or about 4% of
GDP over the period of a nine-month span, with costs
for emergency power facilities estimated at US$110
million (World Bank, 2000). 
9 KPLC did not, however, bear the financial burden for
the three emergency power plants, as discussed in the
next section. 
10 Repeated attempts to obtain a copy of the Nyanja
Report were made through a range of stakeholders
including at the MoE, ERB, KPLC, KenGen and each
of the IPPs, but the report proved unavailable for
public consumption. 
11 The 106 MW Turkwel hydro plant, which was ten-
dered in the late 1980s, came on stream in 1991 and
was funded principally by the French Development
Agency, was considered to be more costly than war-
ranted, causing a degree of donor wariness around
further power development projects. Despite the con-
troversy surrounding the Turkwel plant, according to
selected personnel at the Ministry of Energy, the plant
remains one of the country’s most reliable power
assets. 
12 In a new development, as of September 2005, KPLC
has invited bids from the private sector for a 80 MW
thermal plant to be operational by 2007. No mention
of this plant and/or plans for such a plant was made
during stakeholder interviews and correspondence
between December 2004 and August 2005. 
13 As of late 2004, Westmont is no longer in operation.
14 Duke Energy has now purchased Cinergy. 
15 When losses are higher than 15%, there is always a
portion of the fuel cost that KPLC cannot recover. 
16 In contrast, KenGen’s profits for 2002 amounted to
Ksh 2 280 397 (KenGen, 2003). 
17 This figure (186.5 MW) does not include the emer-
gency IPPs which totaled 105 MW of power but were
only active from 2000 – 2001. 
18 Actual capacity installed was 99 MW as Deutz deliv-
ered 24 MW instead of the 30 MW contracted.
19 The overall high retail cost of the emergency power
plants was a function of the fuel costs and the capac-
ity charge: the fuel cost was high due to inland trans-
portation costs and the capacity charge was high due
to the short duration of contracts as well as the nega-
tive investor perception of Kenya’s power sector (The
World Bank, 2001). 
20 The 80 MW thermal plant noted in footnote 12 will
indeed be a BOOT plant, as confirmed by KPLC. 
21 As noted in footnote 2, this paper is part of a larger
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study led by Stanford’s PESD program, surveying the
global IPP experience. 
22 The ‘electricity market’ also figures prominently in
investors’ decision making, but for the purpose of this
study, the ‘electricity market’ will be treated as a sep-
arate section rather than a component of the ‘invest-
ment climate’. 
23 The reason provided by OrPower4 for not engaging a
local partner was because the project was too small.
24 Previous references to IPPs accounting for 11.2% of
Kenya’s power refer to installed capacity of all plants
for 2004 and, therefore. do not contradict this state-
ment which reflects actual production from Tsavo in
2002-2003 (as referenced in KPLC Annual Report
2003-2004). 
25 Repeated inquiries to Westmont’s offices in Kenya
and Malaysia, from November 2004-February 2005,
went unanswered. 
26 Interviews with stakeholders revealed that Cinergy
has been increasingly less involved in operations of
the TPC. With Duke Energy buying Cinergy in May
2005, it remains to be seen what will be the future of
this equity partnership. 
27 The emergency IPP agreements were signed between
the government and Deutz, Aggreko and Cummins,
respectively, while all other PPAs were signed
between KPLC and project developers. Furthermore,
these agreements were not full-fledged PPAs.
28 Contrary to popular press reports, Iberafrica did not
amortize its plant over the seven years of its first PPA
due to this voluntary reduction to its capacity charge
starting in 2002. 
29 Although this study has not surveyed the public at
large, it has followed general press accounts and par-
liamentary debates related to IPPs, which are seen as
a proxy for the general public.
30 See footnote 12 related to new IPPs. 
31 See footnote 12.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable support
and collaboration of colleagues at the Programme on
Energy and Sustainable Development at the University of
Stanford.
References
Electric Power Act 1997, Government of Kenya. No. 11.
IFC 1999, Summary of Project Information: Kipevu II
Power Project. Retrieved March 
21, 2005 from www.ifc.org. 
KenGen 2003, Annual Report, 30 June.
‘KenGen prepares for IPO towards the end of the year’
2005, Africa Electra, Issue 18. 
Kenya 2005, Africa Electra, Issue 19. 
Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited 2004, Annual
Report & Accounts 2003-2004.
‘Kenya Risk: Infrastructure Risk’ 2004, Economist
Intelligence Unit, March 5.
McEwan, P 2001. ‘IPP Investment in Kenya – an apprais-
al’ Power Economist, 1 March. 
Private Participation in Infrastructure: Trends in
Developing Countries in 1990-2001 2003, The World
Bank, Washington DC. 
SAD-ELEC 2004, Reform and Restructuring of the
Electricity Supply Industry Status Report. SAD-ELEC,
Rivonia South Africa. 
Sader, F 1999. ‘Attracting Foreign Direct Investment in
Infrastructure: Why is it so difficult?’ The World Bank
and the International Finance Corporation Foreign
Investment Advisory Service Occasional Paper, No.
12. 
Victor, D et al 2004, ‘The Experience with Independent
Power Projects (IPPs) in Developing Countries:
Introduction and Case Study Methods’, Working
Paper No. 23. Retrieved November 20, 2004 from
http://pesd.stanford.edu/publications/20528/. 
World Bank 2004. World Development Indicators. 
World Bank 2000. Emergency Power Supply Project,
September 14.
Databases and websites
Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development: retrieved
from
http://www.akdn.org/agency/akfed_indpromo.html, on
March 28, 2005. 
IFC. Summary of Project Information: Kipevu II Power
Project, June 25, 1999. Retrieved from www.ifc.org,
on March 21, 2005. 
International Country Risk Guide: www.ICRGonline.com
World Bank. Emergency Power Supply Project,
September 14, 2000. Retrieved from www.world-
bank.org, on March 21, 2005. 
World Bank PPI database. Retrieved from
http://ppi.worldbank.org/ accessed on October 15,
2004.
Received 11 August 2005; revised 22 September 2005
Journal of Energy in Southern Africa  • Vol 16 No 4  •  November 2005 17
